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Non-Conformance with Regulatory Codes in the Non-Profit Sector: Accountability and 
the Discursive Coupling of Means and Ends 
Penny Dick1 & Tracey M. Coule2 
1Sheffield University Management School 
2Sheffield Business School, Sheffield Hallam University 
Abstract: The concept of means-ends decoupling has recently been suggested as 
one consequence of the problems organizations face in trying to comply with 
institutional rules in contexts of institutional complexity. Such decoupling is 
characterised by the adoption, implementation and scrutiny of particular codes 
of practice which tend not to deliver the outcomes they were developed to 
produce. Recent scholarship focusing on this issue has suggested that such 
decoupling is a consequence of the “trade-off” organizations need to make 
between compliance and goal achievement most especially when the latter is 
difficult to evaluate. While recent scholarship has suggested that this tension 
might be mitigated by the activities of developers of compliance rules, in this 
paper, we explore how actors internal to an organization, in this case, two 
charitable organizations mitigate this tension via non-conformance with 
particular codes. We focus on how the process of accounting for non-
conformance results in the discursive coupling of means and ends as actors 
creatively develop vocabularies of motive which respond to anticipated social 
criticism. 
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Recent scholarly conversations regarding the notion of decoupling have raised some complex 
and taxing issues (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Haack & 
Schoeneborn, 2015; Wijen, 2014). As originally conceived by Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
decoupling represents a situation where, in order to both gain/maintain legitimacy and 
perform the organization’s core task without too much disruption, organizations appear to 
adopt various legitimate “institutional rules” (e.g. policies, practices, rules and offices) but in 
practice, carry on with “business as usual”. Decoupling, however, is achievable only if 
organizations are able to avoid scrutiny and inspection or if non-implementation of particular 
practices and rules is overlooked.  
Recent debates have raised the question of whether, in the current “audit” era, 
decoupling in its traditional sense is actually feasible (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 
2014). Bromley and Powell (2012) argue that while policy/practice decoupling (where 
practices are adopted but not actually implemented) is becoming less prevalent, what we are 
increasingly seeing is means-ends decoupling. This represents a situation in which practices 
and policies are fully implemented and scrutinised, but do not achieve what they are 
supposed to achieve, due to the fact that conformance itself becomes the focus of 
organizational attention.  Wijen (2014) has developed this line of thinking by arguing that 
regulated organizations demonstrate a trade-off between the two types of decoupling. In 
seeking to fully comply with institutional rules, they are less likely to engage in 
policy/practice decoupling, but because regulated organizations often operate in conditions of 
considerable complexity, they are also less likely to be able to meet the goals envisaged by 
rule developers and hence demonstrate means/ends decoupling.  He suggests that rule 
developers must therefore find ways to mitigate this trade-off by paying greater attention to 
implementation contexts when rules are developed. 
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In this article we aim to build on this emergent literature on means-ends decoupling. 
Our core argument is that many regulated organizations are highly motivated to ensure that 
they (appear) to achieve the goals for which they are held accountable. However, because, as 
Wijen (2014) has argued, substantively implementing particular rules and practices may 
undermine this ambition, regulated organizations may not comply with those rules they 
perceive to be particularly obstructive. Given that organizations may be monitored in order to 
ensure that they are compliant, however, it is critical that actors are able to provide 
justifications for non-conformance that are likely to make sense and be acceptable to both 
internal and external audiences. Not being able to provide a convincing justification would 
constitute a legitimacy and reputational risk. Thus, the question we wish to address in this 
study is, how do actors in regulated organizations account for and justify their non-
conformance with particular rules?  
We suggest that actors justify non-conformance by building accounts in which means 
(non-conformance) and ends (the goals for which compliance rules hold them accountable) 
are creatively aligned, such that non-conformance appears justifiable, logical and rational. 
Utilising qualitative data obtained from two charitable organizations in the UK that 
demonstrated non-conformance with particular governance codes, our study illustrates that, 
as Haack and Schoeneborn, (2015) argue, means and ends cannot be understood as pre-given 
realities to which organizational actors orient themselves but are rather socially constructed 
and dynamically produced and transformed as actors engage in dialogue regarding their 
meaning and value (see also, Palermo, Power & Ashby, 2017).  Our specific contribution lies 
in detailing the vocabularies of motive (Mills, 1940) actors mobilise to justify their actions. 
We argue that these vocabularies of motive provide insights into how organizational actors 
“organize social criticism” (Hoogenboom & Ossewaarde, 2005: 613) and hence reconcile 
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competing rationality claims. As Mills (1940: 904) argues, “the differing reasons men [sic]  
give for their actions are not themselves without reasons”. Hence, justifications need not only 
to make sense, they need also to anticipate how external audiences might evaluate 
organizational actions. 
Our article is structured as follows. First we present an overview of recent debates on 
decoupling, moving on to discuss in some depth Wijen’s (2014) recent contribution to this 
debate and from there, our point of departure. We then present some background context to 
our study – the nature, scope and influence of charity governance codes, before describing the 
genesis of the current study along with an account of our methodological approach. We then 
present our empirical findings before finishing with a discussion of their implications for 
theory on means/ends decoupling and non-profit governance. 
 
Decoupling in the Contemporary Era 
As originally described in Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) seminal article, decoupling refers to 
how organizations resolve the tension between meeting efficiency goals and conforming to 
institutional rules.  A key point here is that many of these rules have very little obvious utility 
for organizations in a technical sense but, due to the power of the “myths” that encourage 
their adoption, they are rendered rational and efficacious via the vocabularies of motive 
(socially acceptable justifications for action (Mills, 1940)) that organizational actors mobilise 
when accounting for their decisions to adopt such rules.  For example, as Wijen (2014) 
argues, organizations are often motivated to adopt sustainability standards in the belief that 
this will improve their competitiveness via signalling that their products are more “equitable” 
or “clean”.  Likewise Charitable governance codes, the focus of this study are adopted 
because charitable organizations want to be seen by important external stakeholders to be 
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discharging their accountability and behaving with impunity, a critical perception if they are 
to successfully obtain funding. 
Early theorizing regarding organizational compliance with institutional rules 
suggested that actors that are party to their adoption will generally operate via a logic of good 
faith, whereby they do not require evidence that the adopted rules actually produce the 
outcomes claimed for them. This process is facilitated by rendering such outcomes 
ambiguous, vacuous or categorical rather than technical (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, a 
layer of complexity now applies to this process in that the logic of good faith and confidence 
that prevailed in the era prior to compliance rules (Ezzamel, Robson, Stapleton & McLean, 
2007) is less efficacious in contexts where organizational actors need to demonstrate that they 
are actually implementing institutional rules in the manner stipulated and that the outcomes 
prescribed by institutionalised rules are indeed achieved.  
Wijen (2014) identifies a number of methods that can be used by regulators and rule 
developers to induce organizations to comply with institutionalised rules, including setting 
unambiguous and universal rules or standards of practice; devising incentives and making use 
of monitoring and inspection to ensure that incentives are offered only to compliant 
organizations; and encouraging capacity building via specifying “best practices”.  While such 
procedures are more likely to produce compliance, the danger is that they may also 
undermine the very goals for which the compliance rules were developed. Wijen (2014) for 
example discusses how some sustainability standards categorically ban the use of child labour 
which works to undermine the alleviation of poverty in communities which routinely rely on 
child labour to generate income. In short, compliance rules, because designed to be applied 
universally, may be insufficiently sensitive to implementation contexts, disabling actors from 
achieving the standards to which the compliance rules apply (Wijen, 2014). Thus while these 
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methods of ensuring compliance prevent symbolic adoption or decoupling in its more 
traditional sense, they may inadvertently generate means/ends decoupling.  
While the prescriptive nature of compliance rules coupled with the scrutiny and 
monitoring that accompanies them means that in the current era, organizations are less likely 
to engage in policy practice decoupling, recent research suggests that organizations may take 
alternative steps to avoid the problems of “substantive compliance” charted by Wijen (2014). 
A recent study by Heese, Krishnan and Moers (2016), for instance shows that when highly 
regulated organizations are confronted with incompatible institutional demands, they will 
deliberately and strategically avoid conformance with those compliance rules that are 
perceived to interfere with the achievement of their core task.  For example, they found that 
hospitals offering treatment to the poor would often engage in practices that were prohibited 
by regulations, such as tinkering with the coding of medical conditions so as to obtain more 
funding, but in doing so, were able to meet their fiscal requirements and hence survive.   
Significantly, this study illustrated that the power of the regulator to penalise this non-
conformance was constrained by the fact that doing so was likely to result in negative 
consequences for the regulator itself – it too could face a loss of legitimacy should it be 
perceived to be too muscular in its approach to non-compliance. This study thus illustrates 
that non-compliance may be highly nuanced, and that actors may exercise a great deal of 
discretion in deciding how to conform to particular rules. Such decisions are likely based not 
only on what the rules imply for an organization’s core purpose, or on actors’ assessment of 
the likelihood of sanctions (Oliver, 1991), but also on a judicious assessment of what 
sanctions might mean for those imposing them.  
Nonetheless, when organizational actors make decisions not to conform with 
particular institutional rules, no matter how rational, sensible, inconsequential or justifiable 
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that decision might seem to some parties, actors nevertheless need to account for this non-
conformance in ways that satisfy all the various constituents that comprise both their internal 
and external environments. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue, “organizations that omit 
environmentally legitimated elements of structure…lack acceptable legitimated accounts of 
their activities” (page 349-350, our emphasis). This is most especially the case for highly 
regulated organizations, such as charitable organizations, the focus of this study, whose 
activities and processes are subject to scrutiny and whose modes of conduct are made 
publically available via documentation submitted to the regulator.  
Critically, for highly regulated organizations whose main outputs are “social goods”, 
non-conformance with particular codes of conduct may raise questions regarding the integrity 
and impunity of the actors responsible for these outcomes. Those actors at the top of the 
organization, for instance, may be held particularly accountable for any non-conformance 
given that they need to be seen not to be acting in their own interests such as for personal 
gain.  Indeed, Charitable governance codes are explicitly designed to ensure that members of 
the board behave “in the best interests of their charity, managing its resources responsibly, 
which includes protecting and safeguarding its reputation” (Charity Commission 2016: 
section 2.3; also see The Code Founding Group 2010: 12).  Moreover, given that lower level 
actors may struggle with organizational hypocrisy generated by gaps between stated and 
actual practices, they too may feel incumbent to provide justifications for non-conformance 
to external audiences so as to reconcile any dissonance experienced (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). On 
the other hand, as Heese et al’s (2016) study illustrates, substantive conformance may itself 
become an accountable matter if it means an organization is unable to deliver its core goals.  
Thus whereas Suddaby (2010:15) has argued that we need to understand “why and how 
organizations adopt processes and structures for their meaning rather than their productive 
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value”, we suggest that we also need to understand the converse to this question -  why and 
how members of organizations that decide not to adopt particular processes and structures 
produce convincing accounts of the meaning of such actions.  
To enable us to answer this question, we draw on Mills (1940), who argued that 
justifications for action in the contemporary era are rendered complicated by the fact that 
there are competing vocabularies of motive available to explain particular behaviours, which 
may be seen as more or less acceptable to particular audiences. Increased pressures for 
accountability mean that actors need to anticipate such variation when developing such 
vocabularies. Thus, for instance, Ezzamel et al (2007) illustrate how staff in a secondary 
education establishment in the UK found it difficult to justify their actions without 
considering their broader implications. A head teacher believed that justifying the exclusion 
of a pupil could no longer rely on notions of “just deserts” for bad behaviour, but needed 
instead to incorporate broader considerations relating to student equity. Accountability, in 
short, means that actors must not only be aware of how their actions are likely to be evaluated 
by the array of stakeholders to whom they are accountable, but they must also anticipate 
stakeholder evaluations by constructing vocabularies of motive that provide answers to the 
types of questions that may be raised with respect to such motives.  In this study, we use 
these ideas to empirically examine non-conformance in the context of Charity Governance 
Codes and we ask, “how do organizational actors account for non-conformance with 
particular compliance rules?” Before presenting our empirical study, we first set the context 
for our study by discussing the role of governance codes in the Charitable Sector, indicating 
their criticality for the acquisition and maintenance of organizational legitimacy. 
 
Charity Governance Codes 
9 
 
The media and public continue to place high importance on the societal role of charities, their 
ability to make a positive difference to the cause they are working for and ensuring a 
reasonable portion of funds reach the end cause (Morgan & Fletcher, 2013). In this sense, 
charities are subject to questions both of performance and value (Hirsch & Andrews, 1986) 
and effective governance is often held up as the primary conduit to discharge accountability.  
As such the Charity Commission – as the generic regulatory body for charities in England 
and Wales – plays a key role in encouraging charities to adopt ‘good practice’ in governance 
through issuing guidance, designed to be complimentary to other standards and codes (see 
NCVO, 2005; Charity Commission 2008; 2012a; The Code Founding Group, 2010).  
Charity governance codes act as legitimating structures because, like any compliance 
program, they "signal alignment with the normative expectations of external audiences” 
(MacLean & Benham, 2010) such as practitioners, academics and regulators who all 
contribute to shaping the systems of values, beliefs and rules that underlie the logic of 
governance models, standards and codes. Although such codes are not formally binding, they 
are often issued by committees which claim particular expertise and intend to explicitly 
describe so-called best practice which can act as a means to raise the acceptance of the code 
among various actors (Kerwer, 2005).  
Conformance with these governance codes communicates important signals to key 
stakeholders, especially funders, who will want to be sure that any donations made to a 
particular charity will be used appropriately and ethically. Failure to show conformance with 
such codes, we argue, carries considerable risk for charities because of the increased 
emphasis on accountability in the charitable sector and the fact that charities have to make 
annual returns of their activities to the Charity Commission which are reviewed by the 
Commission and available to the public. For example in the UK, the collapse of the Charity 
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“Kids Company” occurred due to allegations of financial mismanagement detected by 
external audiences (Sadique, Guardian, June 28th, 2016).  Non-conformance thus needs to be 
adequately justified if a charitable organization wants to convince its audiences that this is not 
an unethical activity.  
 
Methods 
Our research question emerged from a qualitative study of non-profit governance, the 
nature of inter and intra-organizational relationships and their intersection with organizational 
sustainability. We did not, therefore, commence the study with the aim of examining the 
tensions these organizations experience between conformance with governance codes and 
achieving organizational outcomes. Rather, our question emerged as we engaged with the 
literature on the means-ends relationship within institutional scholarship and reflected on the 
non-conformance with particular governance codes illustrated by the two cases we discuss 
herei. Because the two cases, as we will go on to illustrate, demonstrated quite different 
responses in terms of the justifications offered, they present us with the opportunity to 
develop theory regarding the reasons for such differences.  
In one case, this non-conformance was evident in the misalignment between the 
official accounts of organizational practices in documents submitted to the UK charity 
regulator – the Charity Commission – and the informal accounts of everyday practices 
narrated in the research interviews. In the other case, the organization had adopted an overt 
approach to non-conformance by securing special permission from the regulator to allow the 
same individual to act as CEO and Trustee – something that is normally precluded in UK 
governance codes and charity law. Yet, at the same time, this organization did not overtly 
report some of the more ethically questionable consequences of this dual role in documents 
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submitted to the regulator.  Thus in both cases, there was a gap between what was actually 
reported to the regulator with respect to governance and what seemed to be happening “on 
the ground”. What is additionally notable about these cases is that all the actors we 
interviewed accounted for this non-conformance as an entirely rational response to the 
tension experienced between conformance and the achievement of the organization’s social 
mission.  
 
 Nature of Non-Conformance Illustrated in the Two Cases 
Case A. Case A, as outlined in Table 1 is in essence a museum whose primary 
mission is to educate the public through the display of often historical artefacts, which 
represent the organization’s primary expenditure alongside maintenance and development of 
the site. Due to increasing problems with maintaining the financial viability of the museum it 
was decided – under a new CEO (selected from the board of trustees)  – to develop a wholly 
owned trading subsidiary in the early 1990s, which ran catering services for museum visitors, 
corporate clients and enthusiast clubs who hire the site for specific events. This, it was 
believed (and as we will go on to elaborate below) was the only feasible way to generate the 
income necessary for survival since, prior to the establishment of this subsidiary, the Museum 
had struggled to sustain itself on admission fees. The board decided that the ‘honorary’ CEO 
of the Museum should also head up the new trading subsidiary whilst also regaining his 
trustee status due to its “anxiety that [he] had lost his [previous] trustee status”; the 
“precedent for this model” had already been set by other large, well-established museums; the 
“level of trust” between him and other board members was very high; and this dual role 
represented “a way of managing it [the museum] better” due to the involvement of a board 
member in day to day operations (Interviewee A1 – see Table 2). Whilst UK legislation does 
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not normally permit the payment of trustees, Case A secured special dispensation from the 
Charity Commission in this regardii.    
Neither the existence of the trading subsidiary nor the CEO’s complex role as trustee 
and CEO (due to dispensation from the regulator) are issues of non-conformance in and of 
themselves. Nevertheless, the lack of formal procedures regarding delegated authority, the 
CEO’s participation in decisions regarding the trading subsidiary upon which his salary and 
livelihood depend, and the overshadowing of public good and social mission by trading and 
income goals demonstrated in formal documents (see below) would be considered issues of 
non-conformance with the detailed stipulations set out in multiple governance codes. We 
contrast the organization’s practices against those supported by the code regimes to highlight 
multiple aspects of non-conformance in further detail below within our findings section.  
Case B: As also outlined in Table 1, Case B is concerned with fighting for the rights 
of people with disabilities through campaigning, training, and the provision of resources that 
help other bodies work inclusively with their target beneficiary group. In the public sphere, 
Case B conforms to what might be considered tenets of good practice in governance. In 
particular, publically available organizational documentation, including annual reports and 
returns to the charity commission, all paint a picture of an organization where the board is the 
ultimate authority, in full control of “reviewing the charity’s aims and objectives and 
planning its future activities” (Case B, Annual Return).   
Accounts of organizational life from both trustees and staff, however, suggest that this 
is surface conformity; 'daily life' within the organization has intentionally been managed – 
since the mid 1990s – to allow decision-making control to sit largely with employees. As we 
will go on to illustrate, this does not take place within some pre-defined, formalized delegated 
authority which is tightly monitored – as prescribed by the codes – but is endemic in ‘the way 
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things work around here’ in relation to all areas of organizational life. More broadly, where 
governance codes privilege CEOs as the connectors between board and staff to enable 
provision of “information, advice and feedback necessary to the board” (NCVO, 2005: 12) 
and “hold [staff] to account” (The Code Founding Group, full version, 2010: 19), Case B 
approaches accountability as a negotiated process of staff and trustees holding each other to 
account through a direct relationship.  From the perspective of organizational actors, any 
other approach was seen to run counter to the social mission of the organization. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the two organizations. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
Data Sources 
Fieldwork with the two organizations outlined above, took place over a six-month period, 
incorporating 3 field visits and data was collected from three main sources: 
Interviews. Twelve in-depth interviews were undertaken with three categories of 
actors: board members (4 interviewees), CEOs (2 interviewees) and staff from various 
hierarchical levels (6 interviewees) (see Table 2). Small numbers of interviewees are typical 
of studies examining accountability processes (see, e.g. Dick & Collings, 2014).  Early 
interviews were largely investigative and resulted in emergent themes that were pursued in 
subsequent interviews. Interviews were loosely (semi) structured around four foci:  
 governance structures, processes and challenges  
 the nature of relations between staff, volunteers and trustees 
 the nature of inter-organizational relations and/or collaborative efforts 
 how such relational dynamics affect decision-making and the setting and safeguarding of 
mission and values. 
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Interviews, which lasted between 50 and 120 minutes, were digitally recorded with 
the permission of the participant and fully transcribed, producing over 78,000 words of text. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
Documents. Four categories of documentary information were consulted throughout 
the fieldwork period: business/strategic plans; annual reports and accounts (submitted to the 
Charity Commission); minutes of board meetings; and promotional material. This allowed the 
corroboration of interview material with formal textual sources. In total, our documentary 
data comprised approximately 478 pages of text.  
Observations. During field visits observations of general organizational life – for 
example work tasks, informal coffee breaks, interactions between staff members – were 
recorded in a field diary. One and a half days of general observation were undertaken at Case 
A and One day at Case B. Although these observations do not feature directly within this 
article, they provided useful contextual information to aid understanding and theoretical 
development.  
 
Data Analysis 
As is recommended with case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989), we undertook an in-
depth comparative analysis of the differences and similarities between the formal, official 
accounts contained in organization documents with the internal everyday talk of 
organizational actors during interviews within and between both cases. We produced a 
narrative account of the particulars around the nature of non-conformance and how 
organizational actors accounted for it in each caseiii. Table 3 gives an overview of the gaps 
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between governance code stipulations and formal accounts and how actors justified and 
accounted for such gaps. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Our analytical process thus consisted of a series of steps, the first of which involved 
the coding of transcripts and documents for each organization. These codes comprised 
phrases, terms or descriptions (Miles & Huberman, 1984) all revolving around the nature and 
dynamics of governance non-conformance. Such descriptions included, for example, stories 
of the dangers that board/staff separation can represent to governance and accountability; 
narrations of how such dangers can be reduced through alternative governance practices; the 
importance of target beneficiary groups controlling the organization as a means of aligning 
social purposes and organizational practices; the criticality of a business approach to 
facilitating the achievement of charitable objectives; and how implementing alternative 
practices can be managed with respect to the perceptions of internal and external audiences. 
These formed our first level codes, which we constantly compared across documents and 
discussed possible conceptual patterns. 
The second step of the analysis involved looking for codes across interviews and 
documents that could be grouped into higher-level themes. For example, comments on the 
dangers that board/staff separation can represent to governance and accountability and the 
importance of target beneficiary groups controlling the organization could be grouped under 
“moral imperative of democratic and participatory governance principles used as powerful 
tool to justify staff-led decision making“, forming a set of first-order categories. Importantly, 
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a key analytical task in this and all subsequent steps was to juxtapose the cases against each 
other enabling the search for similarities and differences. 
The third step involved looking for links among first-order categories in order to 
develop theoretically distinct clusters through a recursive process. For example, categories 
containing instances of interviewees positioning governance codes as hampering or 
contradictory to the organization’s financial viability, organizing model or social purpose 
were collapsed into a (second-order) theme called “discursively aligning means and ends”.  
The fourth step involved organizing these clusters into dimensions that eventually 
underpinned our theorizing. The first theme is “accounting for non-conformance”; the second 
is “reconciling competing rationality claims/anticipating social criticism”. Our first order 
categories, second order themes and theoretical dimension (steps 2 through 4), and the links 
between them, are depicted in Figure 1.   
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Findings 
As illustrated above, we found instances of non-conformance in the governance of both 
organizations under consideration here but we also found that this did not attract external 
scrutiny nor did it appear to be in any sense impacting on the organizations’ internal or 
external legitimacy. The prime reason for this, we would argue, is that non-conformance with 
particular governance codes was articulated as the most effective strategy to ensure coupling 
between means and ends – that is, it was felt by the actors we interviewed in each 
organization that strict adherence to prescriptions sanctified by particular governance codes 
would prevent the organization from achieving the very ends for which the governance codes 
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purportedly held them accountable (see Endnote ii).  In the analysis below, we use the coding 
illustrated in Figure 1 to explicate this argument in detail.  
Activities Aimed at Managing Internal And External Appearances 
A major issue that confronts organizations that do not conform with regulations such as those 
enshrined in governance codes, is how this might be seen both from the perspective of 
external and internal audiences, especially when non-conformance is seen as an accountable 
matter. This is most especially the case with governance codes which, as already discussed 
are explicitly designed to increase organizational transparency and hence accountability. 
Moreover, given that charitable organizations have to report annually to the Charity 
Commission and in doing so provide details of their governance activities, the chances of 
detection of non-conformance are high because external audiences can access these reports 
and make judgements about the organization’s legitimacy from the information provided. We 
found that actors in each organization adopted very different attitudes and approaches to 
dealing with managing internal and external impressions of their non-conformance: 
Case A. Actors in Case A adopted an overt, formal approach to the management of its 
external (and internal) appearance by exploiting a loophole in governance regulations. They 
made a case to the Charity Commission that the CEO should be paid as the CEO of the 
charity's trading subsidiary and to be simply regarded as an ‘honorary’ CEO of the charity. 
On this basis, the Charity Commission granted special dispensation allowing the same 
individual to act as Trustee and CEO (see Endnote ii). This structure effectively enabled Case 
A to legitimately allow the same individual to be responsible for non mission-related trading 
and charitable activities. This dual responsibility was justified by the CEO on the grounds 
that it facilitated decision making. In the extract immediately below, he discusses how his 
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dual role facilitates viable decision making by the board of trustees due to his knowledge of 
the financial returns from the trading arm, which enables him to be more accountable for his 
own financial recommendations: 
 
“And by the end I was realising that I was going to spend £57,000 - which we 
didn't have.  Luckily we'd made quite a bit [from the trading arm of the 
organization] and I went back to the board and said, "Look I'd like you to make 
this decision [regarding the spend of 57K]."  Otherwise, quite honestly, they 
would have gone on my decision about it, I'm sure.  But I wanted them to 
approve it because had it gone wrong and we hadn't got the money we would 
have been in major debt you see."  CEO 
 
In addition, other internal actors discussed the criticality of the trading arm of the museum 
with respect to its role in enabling the survival of the charity: 
 
Because there’s very few grants out there, there’s very few people who are 
actually giving money unless… you know, it’s for sick children or animals, we 
tend to generate our own money and we’ve now come to the decision that if we 
want to do something we’ll tend to generate the money to do it. The majority of 
the funding actually comes from the corporate business side… which has meant 
that we can then promote and put that into other aspects of what we do…and 
okay, we do very much go towards the corporate side of it and we have to make 
money to survive.  You know, we have the charity there as well and we do things 
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to promote the charity side but unfortunately that doesn’t bring the money in. 
     (Staff member, Interviewee A2) 
A notable element of this account is how the actor draws on the notion of 
funding problems for charities which is widely reported in the press and other media, to 
justify the commercial activities of the museum. Moreover, in drawing attention to the 
types of “causes” most likely to attract external funding, the staff member is nuancing 
funding problems by pointing out that some charities (like the museum) are more 
disadvantaged than others. Hence, far from representing two incompatible institutional 
demands (the necessity to produce the social good of the museum and the pursuit of 
commercial interests) (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011), 
the two are weaved into a symbiotic relationship, necessitated by the particular funding 
liability facing a charity whose social good is perhaps perceived externally as less 
worthy than others.  More pertinently, because the commercial interests pursued by the 
museum are constructed as imperative for its survival, the dual role of the CEO seems 
entirely reasonable. If the museum needs to make money to survive and hence fulfill its 
social mission, why would it make sense to replace the CEO with an independent actor 
who may not understand what is actually required when critical operational decisions 
need to be made?  These different institutional demands (the need to generate profit 
versus the need to provide social goods), we suggest, are used as tools (Swidler, 1985) 
by actors to reduce the ambiguity of non-conformance and construct it as a moral 
response to enable the survival of the museum.   
In addition to providing a justification for the dual role of the CEO, discursive 
efforts were also put into downplaying the potential conflicts generated by blurring the 
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responsibilities of the two roles. This was achieved either by referring to the voluntary 
nature of the board’s activities when the commercial subsidiary was initially set up: 
 
We tried to make it that the Board of Trustees were effectively the management 
team.  At the time nobody was being paid, it was a voluntary basis.  We tried to 
keep away from the volunteer stream, though we do recognize that it is people’s 
donation of their time which has been fundamental to the success of the Museum.  
        (Trustee, Interviewee A4) 
…or by downplaying the board role of the CEO who, in the extract below is positioned 
as an informer more than a decision maker, a position reinforced by the CEO’s account 
of decision making illustrated above: 
I think the Board level sets the policies in general terms and we have regular meetings 
at which the Director who is also a Trustee explains… gives an operational report and 
explains where the finances are going.  Clearly day-to-day decisions are best taken by 
the management on the ground and that is what happens but the Director is very good 
in talking to us about all the major things.  I personally have been over the years more 
involved than some Trustees because I’ve also had a management role working to the 
Director.     (Trustee, Interviewee A5) 
 
Note that formal public accounts did not provide transparency on this matter within 
the ‘Structure, Governance and Management’ section of the annual return to the Charity 
Commission speaking of “a pyramid management structure… headed by the Honorary 
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Museum Director who is also a Trustee” but making no mention of his position as paid 
director of the trading subsidiary. Within the staff handbook, he is referred to as the Museum 
Director with the ‘honorary’ status of the role removed.   
In some ways then, the organization’s practices accord with Charity Commission 
guidance which accepts “a particular knowledge of the charity and its working environment” 
as an “advantage” and thus justification for paying trustees for certain services (Charity 
Commission, 2012b p.15). Yet, at the same time the Charity Commission also states that 
trustees have a legal duty to “act in [their] charity’s best interests” through “deal[ing] with 
conflicts of interest” (2012a section 1.1) and that “charity trustees who are also directors of 
the subsidiary have a conflict of interest” (section 7.3). Notably, while Case A accounted for 
policies and procedures for health and safety, fire, equal opportunities, environment, 
disciplinaries, education and risk assessment within the staff handbook and annual return to 
the Charity Commission, there was nothing relating to conflicts of interest or delegated 
authority. In respect of the latter, the Charity Commission stipulates that “trustees must 
always remain collectively responsible for all decisions that are made and actions that are 
taken with their authority” and that “high risk and unusual decisions should not be 
delegated” (2012a, section 9.3).  
During his interview, the CEO recounted a decision-making scenario regarding the 
acquisition of a particular artefact, where both principles were contravened. He started by 
pointing out the unusual nature of the decision in that the Museum “doesn’t normally buy 
[type of artefact]” as they “normally try and get them given or get grant aid”. Wanting a 
quick decision, however, the CEO then described how he went to three fellow trustees, 
recommended and sought their agreement for buying the artefact based on “a majority vote. 
So we went and got it and then announced it at the next trustees’ meeting that we’d done that 
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and said to the other three trustees, ‘I know we didn’t contact you but I trust you’re happy 
with this’.”  Collectively, these findings show that despite dispensation from the regulator 
regarding the dual role of the CEO, the organization’s practices were not in the spirit of other 
rules set by that same regulator. The moral ambiguity surrounding such activities is, we 
suggest that which motivated organizational actors to justify these activities in the ways we 
have illustrated i.e that these actions were in the interests of the museum, not the CEO. 
Case B. As already discussed, Case B demonstrates structural but not cultural 
conformance to institutionalized notions of good governance in that publically available 
organizational documentation, including annual reports and returns to the Charity 
Commission, paint the Board as the ultimate authority, “exercising effective control” (The 
Code Founding Group, short version, 2010:10) over strategic direction and decisions. The 
annual return to the Charity Commission, for example, states: 
The trustees review the aims, objectives and activities of the charity each year. 
This report looks at what the charity has achieved and the outcomes of its work 
in the reporting period. The trustees report the success of each key activity and 
the benefits the charity has brought to those groups of people that it is set up to 
help. The review also helps the trustees ensure the charity’s aims, objectives and 
activities remain focused on its stated purposes… In particular, the trustees 
consider how planned activities will contribute to the aims and objectives that 
have been set.    
What this formal, public account does not make clear is that the initial decision making and 
direction setting is to a large extent driven by staff such that is there is little cultural 
conformance demonstrated: 
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They [staff]  do it [make key decisions about the organization]. We as a Board 
don’t.  I mean, recently we’ve been discussing the organization moving forward 
and we’ve kind of said, well, let the staff and volunteers decide.  The Board will be 
involved later. And clearly if we felt it wasn’t going in the direction that was…I 
mean, basically our job is to ensure that the organization stays within its mission 
statement… its charity mission brief.  That’s our role.  If we felt they were going 
off doing something that wasn’t within that then we’d be reeling it in but it’s 
largely up to them to do it and… if we start dictating to them, that’s when you’ll 
get breakdown in relationships.     (Trustee, Interviewee B6)  
In contrast to Case A, however, actors did not appear to feel obligated to account for 
this to the Charity Commission and did not seem to be concerned about what external 
audiences might make of this non-conformance. In fact, actors presented this as self-evidently 
logical, given the goals of the organization. The effectiveness of the rhetoric exhibited in the 
extract above stems from two discourses, one implicit and one explicit. The implicit 
discourse is that of “mindless rule following” which is often mobilised to criticise 
organizations whose actions are questionable from a “common sense” view point (Ball & 
Ball-King, 2013). This implicit discourse enables the trustee to construct the board as acting 
in a manner conducive to the needs of the beneficiaries and therefore as behaving with good 
sense and impunity. The explicit   discourse is that of empowerment which is frequently used 
as a discursive device to counteract the once prevalent view that disabled individuals lack 
agency and require guardianship, perhaps most cogently exemplified by the ironic title of the 
UK’s Radio 4 programme about disability “Does he take sugar?” The mobilisation of this 
discourse acts to render the codes prescribing [in this case disabled] staff as subordinate to 
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the board (NCVO, 2005; The Code Founding Group, 2010; Charity Commission 2012a) as 
not only inappropriate but even, in this particular context, offensive. Rather than representing 
a formalized and limited delegated authority with clear reporting procedures to enable the 
board to hold staff to account, which would display conformance to the codes, this way of 
being is endemic in all aspects of informal organizational life.    
There is similar non-conformance to the prescription that communication between 
board and staff will take place “through [the board’s] relationship with the chief executive” 
(NCVO, 2005: 12).  In the extract below the CEO draws attention to the dangers that can 
proceed from this prescription:  
 
The board of trustees appointed someone to be the director….And basically what 
happened was she was really awful and the organisation completely changed… it 
was the people with learning disabilities who were emptying the bins and she was 
going out to all these meetings and spending loads of money on taking taxis etc. 
What transpired was the workers were really unhappy….So the board took action 
against that.  But as a result of that, that has affected some of the ways in which 
we work now. Part of the job of a director is to get a strong board and then it's a 
problem because if you've got a director who's not very good and they don't have 
a board that's at all active, then they have more and more power and there's no 
one checking that power at all and that was one of the problems.  And she didn't 
let the workers have any contact with the board, ever, and she was very active in 
that… 
 
25 
 
While the CEO’s accounts of the director’s misrepresentations to the board are not 
within the spirit of governance codes, board-staff relations which are conducted through 
the CEO as presented in the above account are arguably more aligned with code rules 
than the current arrangements described below: 
 
When the trustees are having a board meeting, they come early and we meet over 
lunch and its open for us to discuss things with them.  It wouldn’t be a problem to 
say “look I’m concerned about this or that”. It makes the board less detached 
from the workers on the ground, because they’re not sat up in this hierarchy.  I 
don’t feel like it’s all going on and I’m not contributing… that out of control 
feeling... and decisions are just being made.  I feel that if it came to it, I could 
walk in there [the board meeting] and say, “this isn’t ok”. I wouldn’t feel 
frightened to do that or intimidated.  (Staff member, Interviewee B3) 
Collectively, the excerpts above position accountability as a negotiated process 
between staff and trustees, with each party holding the other to account through direct 
interaction rather than being enacted as a one-way process through which trustees hold staff 
to account stipulated in code regimes (NCVO 2005). Unlike Case A, then, the non-
conformance that is illustrated in Case B is presented as a moral response to the contradiction 
generated by the governance codes themselves: the requirement for the exercise of effective 
control versus the proscription that the organization should, “do what you and your co-
trustees (and no one else) decide will best enable the charity to carry out its purposes” 
(Charity Commission 2013, section 3).  
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As these accounts illustrate the differences in the discursive and non-discursive 
strategies used to manage external and internal appearances can be understood to be a 
consequence of how the nature of the non-conformance illustrated in each case influences the 
accountability imperative for the organization. In Case A, we would suggest, the dual role of 
the CEO could be interpreted and evaluated in a number of ways that could undermine the 
integrity and morality of the board. For example, the dual role of the CEO in Case A poses 
the very real danger that external and other internal stakeholders could rightly point to the 
fact that there is a direct conflict of interest between the board of the charity and the board of 
the trading subsidiary, which imbues this non-conformance with a large element of moral 
ambiguity. The overt co-opting of the Charity Commission into sanctioning the non-
conformance illustrated in Case A reflects, we would argue, attempts to mitigate this 
ambiguity. Any attempt to conceal this dual role through symbolic conformance only, would 
constitute a huge reputational risk because it would suggest either that the organization has 
something to hide – or that the reasons for the dual role are dishonorable e.g. that this is an 
opportunity for the CEO to acquire more power and personal financial benefit.  As a 
consequence the necessity to account for the non-conformance illustrated in this case was 
extremely high.  In contrast, the non-conformance in Case B is a far less accountable matter  
– who else, other than staff (and hence the very group whose welfare is central to the 
organization’s goals) stands to benefit from this?  
The level of accountability required as a consequence of non-conformance also 
explained differences in how actors in Case A and Case B justified this, as we now discuss. 
For actors in Case A, for example, the activities undertaken and the explanations offered to 
manage the external appearance of these practices were not, in themselves sufficient to 
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mitigate the ambiguity of the accountability context.  Actors had to put much discursive 
effort into producing a convincing and coherent justification for this non-conformance. 
 
 
 
The Discursive Alignment of Means and Ends 
Accountability is one of the most highly legitimated “myths” of an organization’s activities in 
the contemporary era (Hallett, 2010), and is seen to be especially important and critical to 
organizational legitimacy in the non-profit sector (Coule, 2015).  Given the strong 
relationship between rationalised notions of accountability and transparency (Sauder & 
Espeland, 2009), non-conformance is, in principle, highly risky. We found, however, that it 
was in fact the necessity for accountability which was mobilised as a core motivation for non-
conformance. This may either illustrate the disciplinary power of the accountability discourse 
(Sauder & Espeland, 2009) or more pertinently, how accountability discourses can work as 
powerful discursive resources enabling actors to provide convincing and acceptable 
rationales, or vocabularies of motive (Mills, 1940) for their actions and activities (Ezzamel et 
al., 2007).  
Within Case A, for instance, we found actors were very keen to downplay the role of the 
trading subsidiary within the organization’s strategy, placing instead a strong emphasis on the 
social purpose of the organization and how the trading subsidiary of the charity existed 
largely to enable that purpose to be met. 
The Museum has two very strict strings to the bow, and that is the history of [field 
of the museum]  and the memorial.  I think it's absolutely imperative that the 
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memorial side is here because it gives the Museum a soul, it gives… it's not just a 
museum of interesting things that [people]  like.  It's got a soul, it's got a reason 
for being here.  And that's very useful and certainly very powerful.  Because it 
almost gives us a moral obligation for being here rather than just collecting 
[artefacts] , you see.   (Trustee, Interviewee A1) 
I’ve seen a document which sets out what the pioneers thought the Museum should 
become and certainly they hoped that it would become a professionally organized, 
financially viable Museum dedicated to educating the public. (Trustee, 
Interviewee A5)  
In these extracts we see the social mission of the museum thrashed out in some detail – 
it does not just exist to exhibit “interesting things that people like” but has an 
educational function; an outcome which, according to interviewee A5 is something that 
was always intended as the primary goal by the founders of the museum and is an 
outcome that needs preserving. Moreover, given that education is a public right, then it 
makes sense that the commercial activities of the museum are primarily intended to 
broaden the appeal of the museum beyond those groups who would traditionally visit 
such places. 
A true memorial is to teach and show people who have no connection with it, in 
order to keep the memory alive.  So what we do, we diversify.  And that's been my 
main driving force, is diversification and inclusion.  And by inclusion, I mean, 
doing different things here… Bringing all these different groups in, doing more 
corporate business and attracting businesses totally outside the Museum and 
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thereby a bit of the memorial rubs off on them.     
 (CEO - Interviewee A1)  
Thus in these extracts we see the Museum’s commercial activities brought into 
discursive alignment with the social mission of the museum which is constructed as 
providing an important public service (education), a mission that cannot be properly 
fulfilled unless the museum is able to attract visitors who would not be traditional 
consumers of such “goods”. In this way, as Palermo et al. (2016) argue, the discursive 
alignment of these apparently incompatible institutional demands (the logic of 
commerce and the logic of social good), functions to co-produce the means and ends of 
the museum such that they are more closely coupled. Indeed, as discussed above, the 
dual role of the CEO, the non-disclosure that the trustee and honorary CEO of the 
museum was also paid as CEO of the trading subsidiary in formal, public accounts and 
removing the honorary status of the Museum Director role in the staff handbook, all act 
to obscure the boundaries of the charity and its trading subsidiary. Yet Charity 
Commission codes, despite encouraging trading subsidiaries as a way of generating 
funds towards achieving a charity’s purpose (Charity Commission 2008; 2012), state 
that “the charity exists for charitable purposes, but the trading subsidiary exists to 
generate income; their aims and interest are different; you need to distinguish between 
them” (Charity Commission 2012a, section 7.3). In orienting to this as an accountable 
matter, the CEO appears to recognise the precariousness of the museum’s position vis a 
vie its commercial activities and shows sensitivity to the potential legitimacy penalty 
this non-conformance may incur:  
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I have this conversation about how we operate and how you use volunteer 
workforces for the benefit of the Museum, not the other way round. And how 
you… you haven’t to be frightened to say we are an attraction first, and, a 
museum second. And they [other museums] say, ‘Oh, no, it’s sacrosanct, how can 
you say that?  
I am aware that there's a wider audience out there with an opinion about what we 
do here…..  But because we're a charity and an organisation that has a wider 
view, yeah, I'm very much aware of what people think.  I want to do the right thing 
for them.  So, I want to be seen to be doing the right thing for the right reasons.  
Nevertheless, and despite the work undertaken in interviews to discursively align 
commercial activities with social mission, the goals and language used to articulate them in 
written accounts suggest that trading and income goals have eclipsed the mission of the 
museum. For example, one annual report states “financial sustainability and growth” as the 
“principle business aim” of the charity with no discursive attempt to connect this to the 
achievement of public benefit required of any charitable entity. Moreover, such reports and 
the staff handbook are peppered with terms such as “executive management team”, 
“business”, “profitability”, “efficiency”, “corporate business” and “company”.   The 
contradiction between these two accounting contexts could be explained by the fact that in the 
latter formal context, actors recognise that funding decisions are likely to made on the basis 
that the Charity can conduct itself in a “business like” manner, and hence the impression 
management tactics utilised in this context are aimed at signalling this competence to 
interested parties (Vasquez, Bencherki, Cooren & Sergi, 2017).  
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Actors from case B also work to bring the means and ends of the organization into 
discursive alignment.  Key actors in this organization also place great importance on their 
social purpose and appear strongly driven by the principles of democracy and the protection 
of individual liberties and rights. Such ideological foundations are endemic in both the formal 
charitable objectives of the organization, which talk of helping a particular section of society 
“obtain their full rights and privileges”, and its processes and practices:  
 
The work is led by people with disabilities, so the way we do things [is different] .  
So like, people with disabilities do training of professionals - I don't.  So I might 
set it up but they deliver the training and what we say to people with learning 
disabilities is, don't go from any… how you think training should be, but how you 
want to do training.  ……….we don’t just accept how things ‘should’ be, we're 
always trying to change things and that thing about the process is really 
important.  So if we don't get the process right then the end result is never right.  
     CEO, Interviewee B1)  
I was first attracted to work here because it’s a political organization and I 
believe in what they’re doing towards rights for [the target beneficiary group]. I 
like the way it works ‘cause it works differently from other organizations because 
it’s empowering to people.       
 (Staff member, Interviewee B4) 
In the quotes above, actors invoke the idea of means acquiring substantive value above the 
ends for which they were designed.  When the CEO says “we don’t just accept how things 
“should be”” in order to produce the right end result, she is effectively drawing attention to 
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the problem of means-ends decoupling, which can happen when organizations become more 
focused on following procedures to achieve particular goals than on the goals themselves. By 
differentiating between training processes as following a legitimized template (how training 
should be) versus a set of personal preferences (how you want to do training), the CEO is 
effectively arguing that the goals of the organization are not simply to provide training for 
disabled people but are focused on “changing things” which, as articulated by interviewee B3 
is necessary if the organization is to ultimately have an “impact” on the faulty “system” in 
society.  Hence, although as prescribed by governance codes, board-staff separation and 
formalized, limited and monitored delegated authority, are intended to render the board’s 
decision making independent and hence protect its moral and pecuniary integrity, in practice, 
these interviewees imply that its moral integrity can pass a litmus test only if the group 
intended to be the primary beneficiary of the charity’s activities lead and drive the most 
important strategic decisions:  
[We are]  an organization controlled by disabled people.  (CEO, 
Interviewee B1)  
Again, here we see that that organization’s concern with following processes that 
produce impactful, not just socially useful or helpful ends, functions to render the 
organization’s non-conformance as responsive and innovative; responses which make sense 
for an organization that is trying to be “different” and “political”. 
We suggest that where the rationale for non-conformance exploits the potential 
problems that substantive compliance can generate (Case B) actors will not be concerned 
about detection of such non-conformance, a proposition that has some empirical support from 
Heese et al (2016). On the other hand, where the rationale for non-conformance remains open 
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for interpretation  (in Case A, pursuing a commercial activity could be seen to be trumping 
the social purpose of the organization and raises further questions regarding the dual role of 
the CEO) actors are likely to be especially sensitive to external appearances. In such 
instances, overt sanctioning of non-conformance from key external audiences, i.e. the 
regulator, appears the safer option for safeguarding organizational legitimacy. In both cases, 
actors argue that the non-conformance with particular governance codes serves to more 
tightly couple actual governance practices with the mission of the organization. Figure 2 
provides a summary of our theory building and we explicate this in the discussion below. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Discussion 
In the current audit era (Power, 1997), it is apparent that many organizations, especially those 
operating in complex institutional environments whose outputs are difficult to evaluate, are 
experiencing a tension between demonstrating conformance with institutional rules and 
achieving the goals that are the ultimate and intended outcome of such rules (Wijen, 2014).  
In our study of two charitable organizations, we have argued that one way in which 
organizations themselves can deal with this tension is by non-conformance with particular 
rules that are perceived to be undermining their capacity to achieve their core mission. While 
this is by no means a new or original strategy for dealing with tensions between conformity 
with institutional rules and achievement of organizational goals, we have focused on how 
actors justify non-conformance in a context of high levels of regulation which renders non-
conformance a potentially risky and highly accountable matter.  
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We have suggested that two key discursive tactics are mobilised by actors as they 
account for this non-conformance. First, where non-conformance may connote that the 
organization is placing the interests of individuals above the interests of the organization, 
actors put much work into producing vocabularies of motive that undermine this connotation. 
This is achieved by appealing to the idea that charitable organizations cannot survive without 
funding; that funding can be very difficult for particular charities to achieve; and that it is 
therefore critical that savvy financial management is enabled via commercial activities and 
especially competent actors, to ensure the survival of the “good cause” for which the charity 
is ordained. Second, where actors perceive that substantive conformance could undermine the 
goals for which the organization is held accountable, they may exploit public distaste for such 
regulation by providing vocabularies of motive that contrast the moral and social benefits of 
achieving  “noble” ends with the essentially damaging consequences of complying with 
particular rules (means).   
As a consequence newer and more sophisticated accounts of organizational rationality 
are produced via reflexive authority (Hoogenboom & Ossewaarde, 2005) in which the ability 
of “leading actor(s) to combine the arguments and interests of everyone involved into a 
‘socially rational’ outcome” (p 614) becomes apparent. Thus in these accounts, means and 
ends are coupled by either smoothing over (apparently) incompatible institutional demands 
(Case A) (Heaphy, 2013) or exploiting and exposing the irrationality of institutional 
contradictions (Case B). In either case, an outcome of this process is that actors are able to 
produce an account which not only demonstrates that the organization is “doing the right 
thing” but is doing it in the interests of those groups for whom its social mission is 
paramount. This we suggest, is a critically important process for understanding how actors 
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work to provide valid “vocabularies of motive” for actions that are not sanctioned within 
particular codes of ethical conduct. 
We further argued that to fully understand the extent to which organizational actors 
are motivated to account for non-conformance, it is important to incorporate the role of the 
accountability context, specifically, the extent to which the nature of the non-conformance 
carries connotations for the ethical conduct of actors at all levels in the organization. We have 
argued that where such conduct is exposed as ethically vulnerable (as in Case A), actors need 
to do more than simply provide rational and coherent accounts of their non-conformant 
activities; they need also to take steps to ensure that that this is sanctioned and approved by 
the relevant regulator. Conversely, where non-conformance actually works to enhance the 
ethical conduct of organizational actors, they do not appear to be worried about possible 
detection, perhaps because they are confident that the codes themselves and any overly 
muscular responses to code non-conformance from the regulator would be the targets of any 
external disapproval. 
Finally, the fact that the non-conformance we observed in these organizations was 
sustained throughout the life-time of the study and to our knowledge, continues to the present 
day, is indicative that such non-conformance is not a temporary phenomenon though as the 
accounts of actors in Case B, illustrate, may change dependent upon who is in charge and 
how they interpret the governance codes. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
Our primary contribution is to emerging theory on means-ends decoupling. Wijen (2014) has 
convincingly argued that this form of decoupling is now more likely to occur than policy 
practice decoupling, due to the power and reach of compliance rules. He argues that while 
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such rules prevent symbolic adoption of institutional prescriptions, if followed to the letter 
they can prevent organizations from achieving the very goals for which they were designed. 
Our study suggests a somewhat different consequence of the implementation of compliance 
rules – greater not lesser focus on the relationship between means and ends. As organizations, 
especially those in the public and non-profit sector become ever more accountable and 
subject to surveillance, the salience of their actual purpose and mission (their ends) increases 
as actors have to work ever harder (via conformance with governance codes) to justify their 
costs, expenditure and fitness for funding awards and/or charitable donations (their means).  
This contingent and precarious existence means that actors are sensitive to the 
implementation of any practice that undermines their (perceived) ability to achieve their 
mission.  
Compliance or conformance with institutional rules differs in its importance for the 
different audiences who have a stake or interest in the organization, and this appears to 
explain differences in how, or indeed whether organizations publically account for non-
conformance. As our study illustrated, formal accounts of conformance as demonstrated in 
returns to the Charity Commission may “airbrush out” areas of non-conformance by 
rendering such activities opaque or ambiguous (as in Case A) or by simply not reporting such 
activities (Case B). Accounts of activities that are more likely to be consumed by potential 
funders, such as annual corporate reports, or by internal audiences (staff handbook) may 
emphasise particular activities (in Case A, commercial activities), or play down others (its 
governance and actual social mission), concerned chiefly with projecting an image of 
financial competence (Vasquez et al, 2017). However, in person-to-person interactions, 
especially where, as in this case, the audience (i.e. the research team) has “power of 
representation” (Kauffman, 1992) (that is, the capacity to present accounts of organizations in 
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public documents such as journal articles) actors at all levels in the organization may show 
sensitivity to how non-conformance with governance codes could be read and dishonourable 
motives imputed, at least for actors in Case A. Here, for higher level actors such as trustees 
and CEOs, reconciling such potential social criticism would appear to be motivated by the 
threat to their identities as strategic and, crucially, ethical actors. Lower level actors also 
showed sensitivity to the potential accusation that the commercial arm of the museum was 
trumping its social purpose. Justifying the importance of commerce was perhaps one way of 
resolving the potential dissonance suggested by this sensitivity (Fiss & Zajac, 2006).  
As our analysis illustrated, actors in both cases emphasised that it was in fact the 
pursuit and achievement of their social goals (their ends) that led them to avoid strict 
conformance with particular governance codes. Whether or not each organization was 
actually achieving the goals they claimed to be achieving is an open question and one that we 
do not believe is empirically resolvable: these are matters of perspective and interpretation, 
and suggest that the functionalist assumptions that characterise recent scholarship on 
decoupling may be flawed (Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015).  
Hence, a further contribution of this study is to the emerging scholarship that has 
examined how the “tension that exists in relatively opaque fields between conformance with 
an institution’s rules (‘the letter’) and achievement of the goals for which those rules were 
defined (‘the spirit’)” (Wijen, 2014:) is mitigated. Our focus on vocabularies of motive 
illustrates that rules may be rendered elastic by mobilising justifications for action which 
undermine their rationality. In a context (e.g. the UK and the USA) where organizations can 
face much criticism for following rules to the letter, especially where these appear to 
undermine an organization’s ability to “get on with its job”, justifications which work to 
expose these potential frailties within governance codes are convincing and compelling. We 
38 
 
believe this illustrates how organizational actors are able to capitalise on the growing societal 
resistance to and distaste for regulation which is seen by some commentators to be one of the 
reasons behind the recent Brexit vote in the UK. 
Finally, the study contributes to the literature on corporate governance which, though 
becoming increasingly theoretically sophisticated, has somewhat neglected the governance of 
non-profits (Cornforth, 2004; 2012). Morrison and Salipante (2007) specifically suggest that 
knowledge of governance practices to achieve broadened accountability to multiple and 
diverse stakeholder groups has lagged. Indeed, the narrow conception that reporting is and 
should be the central mechanism for discharging accountability and legitimizing non-profits 
continues to dominate (Schlesinger, Mitchell & Gray, 2004; Morgan & Fletcher, 2013; 
Conolly & Hyndman, 2013). Our analysis has shown, however, that reporting may be, as 
Heese et al (2016) suggest rather more political than has hitherto been theorized. The Charity 
Commission or any other regulator will have legitimacy concerns of its own that constrain 
how actors in those organizations might react to reports of non-conformance. Moreover, as 
our analysis reveals, actors from charitable organizations do not passively respond to the 
prescriptions embedded in governance codes, they actively seek to mould those codes to the 
context in which they are operating which at times, due to the potential ambiguities such 
actions produce, means that actors have to actively lobby (Oliver, 1991) and/or co-opt the 
regulator so that they can legitimately bend governance rules. In exploring why charities may 
not comply with governance principles yet continue to be legitimate in the eyes of both 
internal and external audiences, we have challenged the prevalent notion of non-profit 
accountability as a somewhat benign and straightforward governance function and recast it as 
a challenging, complex and political process. 
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Areas for Future Research and Limitations 
One major limitation of this study is that we do not know how relevant external stakeholders 
actually evaluate the organizations that are the focus of this study. We have made a 
judgement that legitimacy following non-conformance was conferred on these organizations 
in light of the fact that senior organizational actors made no reference to any apparent 
legitimacy crises in their interviews with the researchers and due to their on-going existence. 
Moreover, the non-conformance we charted in these organizations appears to have been 
sustained overtime. Nonetheless, future studies examining the discursive efforts that are made 
to justify non-conformance with regulatory codes could look at how such accounts are 
received by relevant external audiences. This could potentially be done by examining the 
financial status of such organizations in the aftermath of non-conformance and/or by 
interviewing relevant external stakeholders regarding their views of particular non-
conformant organizations, ideally on several occasions over a period of months or years to 
capture how information about these organizations moves into the public domain relatively 
slowly.  
We have also not been able to differentiate between internal and external conferment 
of legitimacy due to not having data from relevant external stakeholders. Certainly, the 
accounts of the internal stakeholders we did interview are suggestive that the non-
conformance with governance codes we have discussed in this study, was accepted as the 
rational response suggested by those who made these decisions. Nonetheless, future research 
would do well to include a greater number of internal stakeholders than in this study, because 
it may well be that we have managed to interview only those individuals who did approve. 
Indeed we were told informally by actors in Case A that a number of dissenters who 
disapproved of the dual role of the CEO had been “removed” from the organization which, if 
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true, is suggestive that securing approval for non-conformance from internal actors may not 
always be straightforward or guaranteed.  
A further area for study is suggested by the fact that our findings are based on 
retrospective data in the form of interviews and documents. Hence we do not actually know 
how the governance practices that we commented on in this article evolved or stayed the 
same over time, or whether the performance of these organizations in terms of the 
achievement of their respective social missions, was perceived by internal and external actors 
to have changed in any way. While evaluating the performance of organizations operating in 
opaque institutional environments producing essentially social goods is extremely difficult 
(Wijen, 2014; Greenwood et al, 2011), interviews with multiple internal and external 
stakeholders would help improve the ecological validity of the study, while a longitudinal, 
design in which the same individuals were interviewed several times would mitigate the 
possible effects of various types of retrospective bias. This type of research we would suggest 
is critical if we are to detect whether public commitments to social missions of the type 
illustrated in this study operate to push organizational actors into “walking their talk” 
(Christensen, Morsing & Thyssen, 2013; Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012) and/or sow 
the seeds of transformation in more material practices and routines (Ezzamel et al, 2007).  
Finally, we must address the extent to which the findings of this study are likely to 
generalise beyond the non-profit sector. We would suggest that charitable organizations exist 
in environments that are more institutional than technical (Meyer, Scott and Deal, 1983) and 
occupy opaque fields (Wijen, 2014) in conditions of considerable institutional complexity 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008). As a consequence, the theoretical constructs we have applied to our 
cases would be most applicable to other organizations operating in similar environments. 
However, all organizations have legitimacy concerns and, increasingly, are under pressure to 
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“do good” as well as “look good”, a pressure that is intensified by compliance rules in many 
domains of activity (Haack et al, 2012). Thus, we suggest, it is likely that all organizations 
who in one way or another do not comply with regulations will be rendered accountable and 
hence, will be likely to demonstrate similar rhetorical activities to those explored here. Future 
research could usefully explore whether such work differs between those organizations that 
are situated on different points of the institutional/technical environment spectrum. 
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TABLE 1: Summary of Organizations 
Case 
Founding decade 
and mission 
Level and profile 
of income 
Number of 
staff & 
volunteers / 
unionization 
Number and 
recruitment of 
trustees 
Scale of 
operation 
A 
Founded in 1980s 
to advance 
education of the 
pubic through 
provision of 
museum and 
memorial. Core 
mission 
unchanged. 
Approx. £500,000 
87% earned 
11.5% voluntary 
0.5% investment 
1% other 
Approx. 15 
employees; 
135 
volunteers 
Non-
unionized 
8 trustees appointed 
on basis of ͚founder͛ 
status or 
profession/skills 
Recruited through 
personal 
recommendation 
Single site 
containing 
charity and 
trading 
subsidiary; 
national 
coverage 
B 
Founded in 1990s 
to work with client 
group to obtain full 
human rights and 
privileges through 
empowerment and 
self-advocacy. Core 
mission 
unchanged. 
Approx. £500,000 
31% earned 
64% voluntary 
0.5% investment 
4.5% other 
Approx. 20 
employees; 
10 
volunteers  
Non-
unionized 
11 trustees 
75% of board must 
have a disability or 
represent an 
organization for 
disabled people 
Recruited through 
organizational/ 
professional 
networks 
Single site; 
national 
coverage 
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TABLE 2: Summary of Interviewees 
Case Interviewee Role 
A  
A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
CEO and Trustee 
Staff member  
Staff member 
Trustee 
Trustee  
B 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
B6 
B7 
CEO 
Staff member  
Staff member  
Staff member 
Volunteer  
Trustee  
Trustee 
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Table 3 – Charitable Governance Codes, Formal Accounts of Organizational Activities 
Relevant to these Codes and Actor Accounts of Non-Conformance 
 
Illustrative Charity Code 
Stipulations 
Formal organisational 
account 
Summary of non-
conformance from 
interview accounts 
Case A – Educational Museum 
Separation of charity and 
trading subsidiaries: 
“The charity exists for 
charitable purposes, but the 
trading subsidiary exists to 
generate income; their aims 
and interest are different; 
you need to distinguish 
between them” (Charity 
Commission 2012a, section 
7.3). 
 
 
 
 
“Where the board has 
agreed to establish a 
formally constituted 
subsidiary organisation/s, it 
is clear about the rationale, 
benefits and risks of these 
arrangements. The formal 
relationship between the 
parent charity and each of its 
subsidiaries is clearly 
recorded and the parent 
reviews, at appropriate 
intervals, whether these 
arrangements continue to 
best serve the organisation’s 
charitable purposes.” (The 
Core Founding Group, 
2010:11) 
Annual returns to the Charity 
Commission identifies “a 
pyramid management 
structure… headed by the 
Honorary Museum Director 
who is also a Trustee” 
making no mention of his 
position as paid director of 
the trading subsidiary or the 
dispensation granted by the 
regulator in this regard 
(Structure, Governance and 
Management section).  
 
Charity’s annual report 
positions “financial 
sustainability and growth” as 
the “principle business aim” 
with no attempt to connect 
this to the achievement of 
public benefit required of any 
charitable entity.  
Charity’s staff handbook 
peppered with terms such as 
“executive management 
team”, “business”, 
“profitability”, “efficiency”, 
“corporate business” and 
“company”.    
Interviewees report the 
acquisition of special 
dispensation from the Charity 
Commission in order to 
permit one individual to be 
honorary trustee of the 
charity, a trustee of the 
charity and paid director of 
the trading subsidiary (see 
p.11 and Endnote ii), thus 
dispelling the perception of 
non-conformance.  
 
 
 
The lack of formal 
procedures regarding 
delegated authority, the CEOs 
participation in decisions 
regarding the trading 
subsidiary upon which his 
salary and livelihood depends 
(a conflict of interest), and 
the prominence of trading and 
income goals in accounts 
relating to the parent charity 
contravene the detailed 
stipulations set out in the 
governance codes opposite. 
Interviewees spent 
considerable effort justifying 
the blurring of these roles 
based on enhancement of 
financial decision-making 
and accountability (pp. 17-
18); and interweaving the 
commercial interests and 
social mission of the museum 
into a symbiotic relationship 
(pp.18-19; 27-28, 29-30). 
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Conflicts of Interest: 
Trustees have a legal duty to 
“act in [their] charity’s best 
interests” through 
“deal[ing] with conflicts of 
interest” (Charity 
Commission, 2012a: section 
1.1), “[the charity] ensures 
its trustees understand that 
they must act only in the 
charity’s interests and that 
any conflicts of interest are 
identified and managed 
(legal requirement)” 
(Charity Commission, 2008: 
Hallmark 2); “[trustees 
must]  avoid putting themself 
in a position where their duty 
to the charity conflicts with 
your personal interests” 
(Charity Commission, 
2012a: section 2) and 
“charity trustees who are 
also directors of the 
subsidiary have a conflict of 
interest” (Charity 
Commission, 2012a: section 
7.3). 
 
Annual returns and the staff 
handbook provide evidence 
of policies and procedures 
for health and safety, fire, 
equal opportunities, 
environment, disciplinaries, 
education and risk 
assessment with a total 
absence of anything related 
to conflicts of interest. 
 
In constructing their 
accounts, interviewees put 
significant discursive efforts 
into downplaying potential 
conflict of interest that a dual 
roles may generate (pp.19-
20), in particular positioning 
the CEO as an informer more 
than a decision maker within 
the board context (p.20) and, 
again, interweaving the 
commercial interests and 
social mission of the museum 
into a symbiotic relationship 
(pp.18-19).  
Nevertheless, the CEO’s 
participation in decisions 
regarding the trading 
subsidiary upon which his 
salary depends is, by the 
codes’ definition a conflict of 
interest. 
Delegation of Authority: 
“Trustees must always 
remain collectively 
responsible for all decisions 
that are made and actions 
that are taken with their 
authority” and “high risk and 
unusual decisions should not 
be delegated” (Charity 
Commission 2012a: section 
9.3). 
“The board describes its 
‘delegations’ framework in a 
document which provides 
sufficient detail and clear 
boundaries so that the 
delegations can be clearly 
understood and carried out. 
Systems are in place to 
monitor and oversee how 
delegations are exercised.” 
(The Code Founding Group 
 
Annual returns to the Charity 
Commission and staff 
handbook provided no 
reference to policies and 
procedures in respect of 
delegated authority, despite 
evidence of such for health 
and safety, fire, equal 
opportunities, environment, 
disciplinaries, education and 
risk assessment. 
 
CEO recounts a decision-
making scenario where both 
principles set down by the 
Charity Commission were 
contravened; pointing out the 
unusual nature of the decision 
and that it was not taken 
collectively (see p.21).  
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2010: 15) 
Case B – Rights Organisation 
Decision Making and 
Control: 
“Every organisation should 
be led and controlled by an 
effective Board of trustees 
which collectively ensures 
delivery of its objects, sets its 
strategic direction and 
upholds its values” and 
“Trustees have and must 
accept ultimate 
responsibility for directing 
the affairs of their 
organisation” (NCVO, 
2005: 10) 
“The board makes sure that 
its decision-making 
processes are informed, 
rigorous and timely, and that 
effective delegation, control 
and risk-assessment, and 
management systems are set 
up and monitored.” (The 
Code Founding Group, 2010: 
14) 
“Do what you and your co-
trustees (and no one else) 
decide will best enable the 
charity to carry out its 
purposes” (Charity 
Commission 2013: section 
3). 
 
 
Annual return to CC states 
“The trustees review the 
aims, objectives and 
activities of the charity each 
year. This report looks at 
what the charity has 
achieved and the outcomes 
of its work in the reporting 
period. The trustees report 
the success of each key 
activity and the benefits the 
charity has brought to those 
groups of people that it is set 
up to help. The review also 
helps the trustees ensure the 
charity’s aims, objectives 
and activities remain 
focused on its stated 
purposes… In particular, the 
trustees consider how 
planned activities will 
contribute to the aims and 
objectives that have been set.    
 
 
 
Trustee and CEO provide an 
account of the centrality of 
staff to decision-making and 
direction setting, stating that 
they do and should make all 
the key decisions, not the 
board (pp.22-23: pp.31-32). 
A staff member describes 
their willingness to 
challenge board decisions in 
the event that it didn’t feel 
‘ok’ to them (p.25). 
 
Board-staff relationship 
conducted through CEO: 
“She or he (the CEO) should 
provide an effective link 
between Board and staff, 
informing and implementing 
the strategic decisions of the 
Board.” (NCVO, 2005: 11) 
“The board, through its 
relationship with the senior 
 
 
 
Organisational structure chart 
depicts distinct groupings 
with trustees at the apex of 
the organisation, followed by 
the CEO and then the 
functional areas of work. 
Annual return to charity 
commission states: “The 
Board meets approximately 
six times a year, and 
 
 
 
CEO expresses the dangers 
that can proceed from 
relationships between boards 
and staff based on CEO 
brokerage and how this has 
informed current practice in 
the organisation (p.24). This 
is reaffirmed by a staff 
member who describes the 
direct, two-way relationship 
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member of staff, creates the 
conditions in which the 
charity’s staff are confident 
and enabled to provide the 
information, advice and 
feedback necessary to the 
board.” (The Code Founding 
Group, 2010: 11) 
maintains an overview of the 
running of the company and 
charity ensuring legal and 
financial compliance. In 
addition Trustees are 
involved in overseeing the 
strategic direction of the 
organisation. The day to day 
running of the office is 
delegated to staff via the 
Director.”  
 
 
between the entire staff base 
and the trustees (p.25), 
positioning accountability as 
a broad and negotiated 
process.  
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Non-conformance with regulatory 
codes 
Accountability – non-
conformance rendered 
ambiguous by context 
Institutional demands/rules used as 
tools to rationalize non-conformance 
Means and ends discursively coupled 
Incompatible institutional 
demands smoothed over 
Contradictions between 
institutional rules exploited 
Accountability –
substantive conformance 
rendered questionable 
by context 
Actors demonstrate reflexive authority in the production of 
socially rational and hence legitimate accounts 
Figure 2 –Non-Conformance, Accountability and the Discursive Alignment of Means and Ends 
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i
 The data presented here constitutes part of a wider program of four case studies.   The two 
cases discussed were chosen based on their potential to shed light on our area of theoretical 
interest in how internal organizational actors account for intentional failures to conform with 
governance codes and regulations. 
ii
 The order sanctioning this move from the Charity Commission is not publically available. It 
was referred to only in our interviews.  However, in essence, the CEO of Case A has 3 roles 
(trustee, honorary director of the charity (i.e. museum) and paid director/CEO of the trading 
subsidiary). There is therefore considerable ambiguity surrounding the sanctioning “order” 
referred to by interviewees in that the Charity Commission either agreed to the CEO acting as 
trustee and honorary CEO of the charity or as trustee and director of the subsidiary for which 
he is paid.  In either case, this would constitute a de-facto approval of the payment.  The lack 
of transparency/declaration about this payment in public documentation (see below) reflects, 
we suggest, concerns with public perceptions.  
iii
 We see the interview as an accountability context and we infer tension from moments in the 
dialogue where participants demonstrate sensitivity to particular issues by offering 
justifications for action which are not prompted or requested by the interviewer. The 
provision of unprompted justifications is widely accepted in micro-studies of language as 
demonstrating participant sensitivity to potential dispreferred readings of the participants’ 
motives (see Drew & Heritage, 1992; Speer, 2005). 
 
